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Abstract
In this article, the author deals with a number of aspects connected to the theme of access to
justice and in so doing refers in particular to the most recent disputes that have been brought before
the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. The author argues that there is a need to establish clearly, at
the outset, the preconditions that natural or legal person must satisfy before they can turn to the
Community Court in order to obtain judicial review both of measures taken by the Commission or
of the reasons for the Commission’s failure to act.
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INTRODUCTION
By December 31, 1992, the European Economic Commu-
nity is to adopt the measures necessary finally to establish a
single, large market within its territory. This was the commit-
ment that the Member States undertook when they signed the
so-called Single European Act on February 17, 1986.1 If this
commitment is acted upon, Europe, in the year 2000, will no
longer be what Jacques Pelkmans has described as a "customs-
union-plus" or, at best, a "pseudo common market."
2 It will
comprise "an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured
. .. -," As a result, there will be an economic area, extending
from Edinburgh to Syracuse and Lisbon to Berlin, where mul-
tinationals, conglomerates, small firms, traders, large distribu-
tors, banks, insurance companies, and airlines will be able not
only to compete but also will have to compete using commer-
cial strategies that, by the very nature of things, will have to be
different from those that have been implemented in national
markets. Naturally, this marketplace will also be open to over-
seas companies from the United States, Canada, Japan, and
elsewhere, which will be attracted, to an even greater extent
than they are today, by the numerous advantages of a commer-
cially uniform European market.
The Community will have to guarantee that these entre-
preneurs have a modern and efficient system of legal protec-
tion. This is indispensable if the development of the Commu-
nity's economy is to take place in an orderly manner, that is, in
accordance with the rules and programs governing, respec-
tively, the free play of competition and competition policy. In
* Judge, Court of Justice of the European Communities, Luxembourg.
1. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987).
2. Pelkmans, The Institutional Economics of European Integration, in 1 INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW 318, 339-87 (1986).
3. Single European Act, supra note 1, art. 13, at 7.
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my opinion, it was mainly this desire, more than complaints by
the Court of Justice about being overloaded, that prompted
the Member States to set up a court "with jurisdiction to hear
and determine at first instance ... certain classes of action or
proceeding brought by natural or legal persons."4
Notwithstanding the necessarily generic nature of the
formula "natural or legal persons," it is not difficult to predict
that the main beneficiary of the new configuration of the Euro-
pean court system will, indeed, be the business sector. This
will not be, as is often argued in such cases, because the crea-
tion of a court has the immediate effect of making those per-
sons who have access to it more litigious. Rather, the creation
of the single market will give rise to a real and objective need
for legal certainty in the face of factual and legal situations for
which no precedents exist. In other words, the changes in the
European commercial and economic context cannot help but
affect the way in which the Community's antitrust legislation is
implemented and interpreted.
For instance, the Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community (the "Treaty of Rome" or the "Treaty")
justifies the prohibitions laid down in Articles 85 and 86- on
the grounds that the prohibited activities are "incompatible
with the common market .... 6 Hence, it was the intention of
the draftsmen of the Treaty of Rome, that those provisions
would be mainly to protect intra-Community trade against at-
tempts by businesses to compartmentalize the Common Mar-
ket by means of agreements or abuses of dominant positions.
But with the achievement of a market without public economic
frontiers, such businesses will probably lose interest in rebuild-
ing barriers that are no longer useful for their purposes, since
they will have to confront each other in a single field and, at
the same time, fight off competition from outside Europe. In
that event, the antitrust rules will have to be construed, above
all, as provisions designed to protect the individual's right to
participate in business activities on terms of free and fair com-
petition. We will then see businesses themselves taking action
4. Id. art. 11, at 6.
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
85-86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, (Cmd. 5179-11) at 32-33 (official English version),
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49 (1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
6. Id. art. 85(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 33, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48.
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against competitors' anti-competitive behavior in order to se-
cure equality of opportunity and freedom to compete for oper-
ators in the supra-national single market.
Apart from businessmen, others too will start to knock, or
will knock more frequently, on the doors of Community law, in
particular consumers or, rather, consumer associations. They
will assert their right to purchase goods and services at market
conditions that are optimal and uniform throughout the Com-
munity. Consequently, the Commission will be called upon to
tackle radically new administrative problems, and it is obvious
that the solutions adopted to these problems will not invaria-
bly meet with everyone's approval.7 The Community courts of
first and second instance will have the task of finding legal so-
lutions, with the awareness that in so doing they will be con-
tributing to the building of an arsenal of case law, which will
serve as a genuine code of conduct to all those working in the
market and the supervisory institution. Hence, there is the
need to establish clearly, at the outset, the preconditions that
natural or legal persons must satisfy before they can turn to
the Community Court in order to obtain judicial review both
of measures taken by the Commission or of the reasons for the
Commission's failure to act. In this article, I shall deal with a
number of aspects connected with this theme and in so doing I
shall refer in particular to the most recent disputes that have
been brought bef6re the Court in Luxembourg.
I. THE INDIVIDUAL'S CONDITIONAL RIGHT TO
INSTITUTE ANTITRUST PROCEEDINGS
For authorities responsible for supervising and enforcing
antitrust legislation,
private suits are ... more of an important supplementary
enforcement device. They may be the most effective way of
policing the multitude of comparatively local and insignifi-
cant violations that will tend to escape the glance of federal
enforcement authorities or that, even if noticed, do not
merit the expenditure of limited enforcement resources.'
To my mind, this is the philosophy behind section 4(a) of
7. An example of this state of uncertainty is afforded by the continuing debate
on the applicability of Article 85 to concentration agreements between undertakings.
8. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 257 (1959).
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the Clayton Act, which provides as follows: "[A]ny person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."'
In Community antitrust law there are no so-called "treble-
damage actions." Instead, article 3 of Regulation No. 1710 au-
thorizes the Member States and "persons who claim a legiti-
mate interest"'" to apply to the Commission with a view to its
finding that the antitrust provisions of the Treaty have been
infringed. If an infringement is found, the Commission "may
by decision require the undertakings or associations of under-
takings concerned to bring such infringement to an end."'' 2
Consequently, under EEC law, a person who initiates antitrust
proceedings certainly does not do so because he is attracted by
the prospect of a substantial pecuniary recompense. Conse-
quently, at first glance it might appear easy to lay a complaint
before the Commission because little must be proved; but, at
the same time, such a complaint seems pointless because noth-
ing is to be gained. This, however, is not the case. In my view,
the relationship between the complaint and the Commission
has a fairly substantial content in Community law and yields
results that are substantially profitable for both parties. Let us
examine how this is so.
The first point to be clarified is the contcept of "legitimate
interest." Under article 3 of Regulation No. 17, the individ-
ual's right to make a complaint is conditional.' 3 What must the
complainant prove in order for his complaint to be acted
upon? The Court has not yet ruled on this question. The view
taken by one learned writer is that "any reasonably direct and
practical interest in the outcome of the complaint would be
sufficient."' 4 I would point out, however, that as a rule, no-
body will take the trouble to make a complaint unless there is
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
10. Council Regulation No. 17, art. 3, 5 J.O. 204, at 205-06 (1962), OJ. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87, 88, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2421, at 1731 [hereinafter
Regulation 17].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Temple Lang, The Position of Third Parties in EEC Competition Cases, 3 EuR. L.
REV. 177, 179 (1978).
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the prospect of obtaining at least something of practical utility.
On the other hand, a complaint cannot be regarded as the
mere identification of a particular economic fact, with the
Commission being free to decide whether or not it should act
thereon. If that were the case, the Community legislature
would certainly not have required the Commission to inform
the complainant (Member State or natural or legal person, as
the case may be) of the reasons why it does not intend to act on
the complaint.
What then is the legal feature that enables an individual to
have the same power of complaint as a Member State? In the
first place, when the Commission acts under the provision in
question "on its own initiative," it does so essentially with a
view to restoring the free play of competition in the Common
Market. This being so, the subject of the application made by
the private individual must be directly connected with the
proper operation of Community trade so that by adhering to
the Commission's intervention, operators in the market-and
hence not only the complainant-can carry out their economic
activities in complete freedom with respect to the behavior of
the undertaking that was the subject of the complaint.
Accordingly, a "legitimate interest" may be said to exist
outside of the confines of the personal sphere of the complain-
ant, transcending it so as to coincide with the general interest
of the legal order. In the final analysis, a party who makes an
application to the Commission does not assert a right autono-
mously, as is the case in U.S. law where a person acts in order
to obtain damages. A complainant is not even a straightfor-
ward informant of the Commission. On the contrary, as a per-
son with a legitimate interest in the complaint, the complainant
is entitled to call upon the supervisory authority to act in order
to enforce the Community antitrust laws while undertaking to
collaborate with that authority.
According to the judgment in GEMA v. Commission,'-' an
applicant under article 3 of Regulation No. 17 is not entitled to
obtain from the Commission a decision on the existence of the
alleged infringement of the Community rules. 16 According to
the wording of the article, "even when the Commission has
15. Case 125/78, 1979 E.C.R. 3173, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8568.
16. Id. at 3189-90, 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8568, at 8257.
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found that there has been an infringement of Article 85 or Ar-
ticle 86, it may (and not 'must') . . .require the undertakings
concerned to bring such infringement to an end . . . ."" Cer-
tainly, the Commission may, for instance, address to the un-
dertakings recommendations for the termination of the in-
fringement.' However, it is clear that if the undertaking in
question persists in its infringing conduct, the supervisory au-
thority may not stand idly by but will be obliged, inter alia, by
virtue of Article 155 of the Treaty,' 9 to order the undertaking
to terminate the infringement.2 0
If, however, the Commission takes no action, it must, in
any event, communicate to the complainant its reasons for tak-
ing no action;2 ' and, as we shall see later, the complainant may
bring an action before the Community Court to have that com-
munication declared void. 22 Lastly, if the Commission, in or-
der to avoid determining whether the action (or inaction) is
lawful or not, refuses to provide the complainant with explana-
tions as to the outcome of his complaint, the latter will be enti-
tled to bring an action for failure to act with respect to that
omission under Article 175 of the Treaty.2 ' It may, therefore,
be stated that Regulations Nos. 17 and 99/63 confer a series of
rights-and, also, obligations-on the complainant, that are
justified only on the grounds that the complainant has a spe-
cific legal interest.24 The other side of the coin is that under
17. Id. at 3197, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8568, at 8262 (Opinion of Advo-
cate General Capotorti) (emphasis in original).
18. See Regulation 17, supra note 10, art. 3(3), at 206, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
62, at 87, Common Mkt. Rep. 2421, at 1731.
19. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 155, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 53, 298
U.N.T.S. at 71.
20. See Joliet, Lord Bethell Devant la Cour de Justice: En Avion ou en Bateau... ?, 18
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROP EN 552, 559 (1982).
21. See Comm'n Regulation No. 99/63, art. 6, 6J.O. 2268/63, at 2269 (1963),
OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 47, 48, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2641, at 1803
[hereinafter Regulation 99/63].
22. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
23. See EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 175, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 58, 298
U.N.T.S. at 76.
24. See Fediol v. Commission, Case 191/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,013. There, relating to anti-dumping proceedings, the Court stated
the following:
[Clomplainants must be acknowledged to have a right to bring an action
where it is alleged that the Community authorities have disregarded rights
which have been recognized specifically in the regulation, namely the right
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these regulations the Commission has precise duties vis-a-vis
complainants; in return, the Commission may require com-
plainants to take positive action, which, in practice, takes the
form of a requirement to collaborate with the Commission.2 5
In this regard, therefore, the individual and the Commis-
sion are pursuing the same aim. Having said this, it must be
pointed out that, the fact that the claimant may and must co-
operate With the Community authority does not transform the
Commission's inquiry into a direct confrontation between pri-
vate individuals making accusations and private individuals de-
fending themselves. On the contrary, Article 89 of the
Treaty2 6 is designed to ensure that only the Commission will
investigate suspected infringements of competition rules.2 7
The Commission is, and remains, in control of the procedure.
Admittedly,: the law confers on the complainant a right to be
given all the information that is necessary for the proper con-
duct of the investigation 2  and-in the case of discontinu-
ance-to be informed of the reasons why his complaints were
rejected. This right is accorded to the complainants, because
they have an interest coinciding with the general interest of the
to lodge a complaint, the right, which is inherent in the aforementioned
right, to have that complaint considered by the Commission with proper
care and according to the procedure provided for, the right to receive infor-
mation within the limits set by the regulation and finally, if the Commission
decides not to proceed with the complaint, the right to receive information
comprising at the least the explanations guaranteed by . . . the regulation.
Furthermore it must be acknowledged that, in the spirit of the princi-
ples which lie behind Articles 164 and 173 of the Treaty, complainants have
the right to avail themselves, with regard both to the assessment of the facts
and to the adoption of the protective measures provided for by the regula-
tion, of a review by the Court appropriate to the nature of the powers re-
served to the Community institutions on the subject.
Id. at 2935, 28-29, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013, at 14,172-73.
25. See CICCE v. Commission, Case 298/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1105, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,157. There, the Court, in dismissing the application brought by the
Community's Cinematographic Committee; held that "the Commission was justified
in requiring the abuse alleged by the CICCE to be proved or at least corroborated
[by the CICCE] by examples .... " Id. at 1124, 25, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,157, at 15,906. In view of the inaction of the complainant, the decision to discon-
tinue the investigation was, therefore, to be regarded as lawful.
26. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 89, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 34, 298
U.N.T.S. at 49-50.
27. See id.
28. See AKZO Chemie v. Commission, Case 53/85, 1986 E.C.R. 1965, 1989,
17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,318, 16,968.
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legal order, which distinguishes them from other third parties.
This right also marks the absolute limit of their participation in
the investigation. On the other hand, the Commission is
under a duty, according to the law and the principles laid down
in the Court's case law, to observe and enforce the right of the
undertakings under investigation to a fair hearing.
29
II. THE COMMISSION'S STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS
When the Commission, after receiving a complaint and
carrying out an investigation, has sufficient evidence to deter-
mine that an antitrust provision has been infringed, it sends a
communication to the undertaking concerned.3 0 According to
the Court, that communication
must set forth clearly all the essential facts upon which the
Commission is relying at that stage of the procedure. That
may be done summarily and the decision is not necessarily
required to be a replica of the Commission's statement of
objections. The Commission must take into account the
factors emerging from the administrative procedure in or-
der either to abandon such objections as have been shown
to be unfounded or to amend and supplement its argu-
ments, both in fact and in law, in support of the objections
which it maintains, provided however that it relies only on
facts on which the parties concerned have had an opportu-
nity to make known their views and provided that, in the
course of the administrative procedure, it has made avail-
able to the undertakings concerned the information neces-
29. In this connection, the Court, in Musique Diffusion Fran~aise v. Commis-
sion, Joined Cases 100-103/80, 1983 E.C.R. 1825, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8880, stated that the provisions of Regulations 17 and 99/63
are an application of the fundamental principle of Community law which
requires the right to a fair hearing to be observed in all proceedings, even
those of an administrative nature, and lays down in particular that the un-
dertaking concerned must have been afforded the opportunity, during the
administrative procedure, to make known its views on the truth and rele-
vance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used by
the Commission to support its claim that there has been an infringement of
the Treaty.
Id. at 1880-81, 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8880, at 8385; seeJeantet, La Di-
fense dans les Procidures Ripressives en Droit de la Concurrence, 22 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT EUROPtEN 53, 53-67 (1986).
30. Regulation 99/63, supra note 21, art. 2(1), 6J.O. 2268/63, at 2269, O.J. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 47, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2637, at 1802.
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sary for their defence."'
In BAT and Reynolds v. Commission 3 the Court ruled for the
first time on complainants' expectations and claims with regard
to the Commission's statement of objections. In that case,
British American Tobacco ("BAT") and R.J. Reynolds ("Reyn-
olds") brought an action against a decision rejecting their
complaints on the grounds, inter alia, that the Commission had
not explained why it changed its view with respect to the
charges brought in the statement of objections notified to
Philip Morris and Rembrandt. The applicants thought they
could discern the existence of dark plots hatched between the
Commission and the companies against which the charges had
been brought, and they instituted proceedings before the
Court with a view to ascertaining the content of certain docu-
ments that they believed would throw light on that sudden volte
face.
The Court rightly dismissed these claims. It was stated,
however, that when
31. Musique Difusion Franqaise, 1983 E.C.R. at 1881-82, 14, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8880, at 8385.
32. British American Tobacco Co. and RJ. Reynolds Indus. v. Commission,
Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, 1987 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405.
The facts of the case may be summarized as follows: In April and May 1981, Rem-
brandt Group Limited ("Rembrandt"), a South African multinational, transferred to
Philip Morris, for US$350 million, half the equity in Rothmans Tobacco Limited,
which in turn had a majority holding in the English company Rothmans Interna-
tional, the leading cigarette manufacturer in the Community. Id. at _, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,722-23. British American Tobacco Co. ("BAT")
and R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. ("Reynolds"), disappointed at seeing a transaction
that they thought was within their grasp slip through their fingers at the last moment,
submitted a complaint to the Commission concerning the agreement between Rem-
brandt and Philip Morris, which alleged that the agreement infringed Articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,724,
17,726. After carrying out a rapid investigation, the Commission decided that the
charges were founded and asked the undertakings in question to alter their agree-
ment-failure to do so would result in annulment of the agreement. Complex nego-
tiations followed and culminated, in 1983, with the conclusion of a new agreement.
Under the agreement, Philip Morris obtained from Rembrandt only 24.9% of the
voting rights in Rothmans International. Id. at _, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,405, at 17,724. The earlier requirements that related to commercial cooperation,
which caused the agreement to be prohibited, were removed, while the clauses relat-
ing to each of the two partners' pre-emption rights were reinforced. However, the
price of the transaction remained unvaried. See id. The new approach was deemed to
be compatible with Community law and so the Commission decided to close the in-
vestigation. This resulted in the applications brought by BAT and Reynolds before
the Court ofJustice. Id. at _; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,731.
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the Commission ultimately decides to reject the complaints
it must give as its reasons for that decision its final assess-
ments based on the situation existing at the time when the
procedure is closed, but it is not under a duty to explain to
the complainants any differences with respect to its provi-
sional assessments set forth in the statement of objec-
tions.33
Indeed, there is no doubt that any conflicting statements
made by the investigating authority, however deserving of crit-
icism, do not entitle third parties to search the files of the in-
vestigating authority or the undertakings under investigation
in order to substantiate their suspicions. On the other hand, in
the context of an antitrust action, the Court's guidance is not
to be construed as meaning that the Commission is free to
change its opinion without having to give an account to the
various interested parties. On the contrary, if the Commission,
after having formed a view on the factual and legal aspects of
an undertaking's conduct, proposes to close the file, its obliga-
tion to provide the complainants with the reasons why it is tak-
ing that course of action assumes special importance; in fact,
almost invariably it will be a question of casting light on a situ-
ation in which lawful and unlawful aspects have been inextrica-
bly mingled.
Furthermore, the party, who by making a complaint ena-
bled the supervisory authority to find that the Treaty rules had
been infringed, must be able to know the reasons or the factual
basis by which the undertaking's behavior is now deemed to
accord with Community requirements. This is especially true
when that party is a direct competitor of the undertaking com-
plained of. In the final analysis, while communication of the
objections is an essential safeguard for the defense of under-
takings, 34 the decision to close a file constitutes-for the com-
plainants as well as the companies who were the subject of the
inquiry-an essential guarantee of legal certainty. Although
formally addressed to the complainants, in substance the
BA T/Reynolds decision constitutes the Commission's view on
what, following the statement of objections, the undertaking
33. British American Tobacco Co. and R.J. Reynolds Indus. v. Commission,
Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, No. 244797, para. 15, at 9 (Order of the Court ofJune
18, 1986).
34. Jeantet, supra note 29, at 59.
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that was the subject of the inquiry has done to regularize its
situation in light of the Community rules.
III. CLOSING A FILE IN AN ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION
Where the Commission finds "that on the basis of the in-
formation in its possession there are insufficient grounds for
granting the application, it shall inform the applicants of its
reasons and fix a time-limit for them to submit any further
comments in writing." 5 The Court, interpreting this provi-
sion in GEMA, held that this communication is intended only
for information purposes and "implies the discontinuance of
the proceedings .... 6 However, this does not prevent the
Commission from reopening the file, particularly where, within
the period allowed by the Commission for that purpose, the
applicant puts forward fresh elements of law or fact.
In academic circles, this ruling was the subject of consider-
able perplexity and there was no shortage of attempts to iden-
tify avenues that would give the complainant a means of action
in order to protect his initiative. 7 On the other hand, the
Commission, on the strength of that pronouncement of the
Court, stated that the communication referred to in article 3(2)
of Regulation 1738 is "not a Decision within the meaning of Arti-
cle 189 of the EEC Treaty and cannot be challenged before the
Court of Justice. ' 3 9
To my mind, what emerges from these words is a pro-
foundly disconcerting situation. The closing of files in anti-
trust investigations and the possibility of communication by
the Court of the justification for closing the file are left entirely
to the discretion of the Commission. To put it bluntly,
35. Regulation 99/63, supra note 21, art. 6, at 2269, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-
64, at 47, 48, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2641, at 1803 (the application in this case
is made pursuant to Article 3(2) of Regulation 17).
36. GEMA v. Commission, Case 125/78, 1979 E.C.R. 3173, 3189, 17, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8568, at 8257.
37. See, e.g., R. JOLIET, LE DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL DES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPfEN-
NEs 65 (1981); Temple Lang, supra note 14, at 181; Waelbroeck, Judicial Review of
Commission Action in Competition Matters, in 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 179, 202 (B.
Hawk ed. 1984).
38. Regulation 17, supra note 10, art. 3(2), at 205-06, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
62, at 87, 88, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2421, at 1731.
39. Comm'n, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy 118 (1982) (emphasis
added).
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whether such a measure may or may not be challenged de-
pends on whether the Commission decides to call the commu-
nication a "decision." In brief, we have come a very long way
from the idea of cooperation between the investigating author-
ity and the complainant-be it a Member State or a private in-
dividual or undertaking. This cooperation underlies the pres-
ent rules on antitrust, and the Commission must continue to
use these rules to guarantee free competition within the single
European market.
In my opinion as Advocate General in the BAT/Reynolds
case,4" I endeavored to identify the rules upon which the sys-
tem should be based for the collaborative relationship between
the investigating authority and the complainant to be fruitful.
In the first place, the communication under article 641 cannot
be intended merely to inform the complainant of the reasons
for the discontinuance of the proceedings where that has al-
ready been decided. On the contrary, it should enable the com-
plainants to comment on the reasons why the Commission
plans to reject the application. Moreover, if this were not true,
imposing a time-limit for the reply would be meaningless; time-
limits are imposed when it is necessary to reach a result rap-
idly. Experience shows that the reopening of an investigation
that has just been closed rarely is a matter of urgency. Addi-
tionally, an obligation to give notice of these reasons satisfies
two interests: it enables the subject of the communication to
check whether these matters have been correctly assessed, and
it enables the Commission to establish whether, on the basis of
the comments submitted, it has sufficient justification for dis-
continuing the proceedings.
On the other hand, as regards the possibilty of challenging
the discontinuance of the proceedings, I consider that the fol-
lowing principles hold good: First, the right to bring an action,
having its origin in the aims of the competition rules, cannot
be made conditional upon the form of the measure rejecting
the complaint; second, although it is not obliged to adopt a
definitive decision as to the existence of an infringement, the
40. British American Tobacco Co. and RJ. Reynolds Indus. v. Commission,
Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, 1987 E.C.R. _, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405,
at 17,766-80.
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Commission cannot suspend ad libitum an investigation com-
menced by it. On the contrary, from the provisions of Regula-
tions Nos. 17 (in particular articles 9(3) and 19)42 and 99/63
(in particular article 6), it is apparent that, when the Commis-
sion intends to close the file in an investigation, it is obliged to
(a) notify the complainant of its reasons for forming that inten-
tion; (b) allow him a reasonable period in which to submit his
comments; and (c) adopt a definitive measure with respect to
the application, not the infringement.
There is a third principle. The closing of the file is bind-
ing on the Commission in the same way as a negative clear-
ance, only insofar as the state of affairs giving rise to that par-
ticular decision does not change. Since it is addressed to the
complainant, on the other hand, that measure has no binding
effects on third parties, other than that of restoring to the
Member States the power to apply Articles 85 and 86. The
conclusion to which these remarks lead is obvious. Since a de-
finitive decision on the application guarantees the certainty of
the legal relations between the parties, the complainant will be
entitled to exercise his right to institute proceedings with
knowledge of the Commission's response to his observations,
and the Court will be in a position to review comprehensively
and effectively the legality of the measure adopted with respect
to him.45
CONCLUSION
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty,46 which confers on the
Court the power to review the legality of acts of Community
institutions capable of having legal effects, distinguishes two
classes of persons entitled to institute proceedings for annul-
ment: persons to whom the measure is addressed and persons
who, insofar as they do not fall into the first category, must
42. Regulation 17, supra note 10, arts. 9(3), 19, at 207, 210, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 89, 92, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2481, 2581, at 1755, 1791.
43. Regulation 99/63, supra note 21, art. 6, at 2269, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-
64, at 48, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2641, at 1803.
44. See Regulation 17, supra note 10, art. 9(3), at 207, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
62, at 89, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2482, at 1755.
45. See CICCE v. Commission, Case 298/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1105, 1122, 18,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,157, at 15,905-06.
46. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 173, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 57, 298
U.N.T.S. at 75-76.
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prove that the measure is of such a kind as to be of "direct and
individual" concern to them. In the latter case,
[p]ersons other than those to whom a decision is addressed
may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision
affects them by reason of certain attributes which are pecu-
liar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these
factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of
the person addressed.47
It is easy to see that if such criteria were applied literally,
actions brought to obtain the annulment of decisions granting
exemptions or negative clearances of which the applicants are
not the addressees would be, in most cases, dismissed as inad-
missible. In order to avoid that deficiency, the Court, in Metro
v. Commission,4" ruled for the first time on the admissibility of
an action brought by a third party against the grant of an ex-
emption and stated:
It is in the interests of a satisfactory administration ofjustice
and of the proper application of Articles 85 and 86 that nat-
ural or legal persons who are entitled, pursuant to Article
3(2)(b) of Regulation No 17, to request the Commission to
find an infringement of Articles 85 and 86 should be able, if
their request is not complied with either wholly or in part,
to institute proceedings in order to protect their legitimate
interests.
49
Following that judgment, academic writers, albeit expres-
sing their approval for the solution in principle, pointed out
that the Court had failed to clarify the grounds upon which the
applicant, Metro, was to be regarded as having been "individu-
ally" affected by the decision granting exemption.50 Recently
again in the BAT/Reynolds case 5' the company, Rembrandt, in-
tervening on the side of the Commission, argued that the ac-
tion, brought against the decision to close the file on the inves-
tigation, had to be regarded as inadmissible, because the appli-
47. Plaumann v. Commission, Case 25/62, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 107, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8013, at 7274.
48. Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435.
49. Id. at 1901, 13, CommonMkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7848.
50. See, e.g., Joliet, supra note 37, at 93; Waelbroeck, supra note 37, at 200.
51. British'American Tobacco Co. and R.J. Reynolds Indus. v. Commission,
Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, 1987 E.C.R. _, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405.
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cants had to show that the measure in question affected them
"directly and individually" in the sense that it was prejudicial
to their specific interests.52 However, I would observe that the
criticism expressed by those academics is directed against the
very obstacle that the Court sought to eliminate; in other
words, with regard to the criteria of admissibility that are laid
down in Article 173, and were strictly interpreted in Plaumann
v. Commission,5 the formula employed in Metro54 introduces an
exception of a special nature, which is justified by the overrid-
ing interest of verifying in court proceedings whether the com-
petition rules have been properly applied.
Consequently, for the purposes of the admissibility of the
application, it is not necessary in antitrust proceedings to con-
sider whether the contested measure was of individual concern
to the applicant. Nor can a decisive role be played in that re-
gard by the fact that he complained or intervened in the course
of the administrative inquiry. Indeed, in view of the imperative
requirement to secure the proper implementation of Articles
85 and 86, a person may also be held to have standing,
although he was not involved in the action taken by the Com-
mission, if he maintains that the Commission's action would
prejudice a legal position of his that is directly protected by
Community antitrust rules. In the final analysis, to be able to
challenge before the Community Court a measure of the anti-
trust authority that is aimed at third parties, an applicant must
show in every case that he has an interest in the action. To that
end, he will, therefore, have to show the possible repercus-
sions-not the specific repercussions-to his legal position. 55
52. Id. at _, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,733.
53. Case 25/62, 1963 E.C.R. 95, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8013.
54. Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8435.
55. See C.S. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE § 9.05 (1981).
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